In an environment subject to random ‡uctuations, when does an increase in the breadth of activities in which individuals interact together help foster collaboration on each activity? We show that when players, on average, prefer to stick to a cooperative agreement rather than reneging by taking their privately optimal action, then such an agreement can be approximated as equilibrium play in a su¢ ciently broad relationship. This is in contrast to existing results showing that a cooperative agreement can be sustained only if players prefer to adhere to it in every state of the world. We consider applications to favor exchange, multimarket contact, and relational contracts.
Introduction
Long-term relationships allow self-interested individuals to achieve cooperation by putting the future at stake: individuals cooperate with each other, because the long-term gain from future interactions exceeds the short-term gains they forgo by pursuing privately optimal courses of action.
However, random ‡uctuations in the environment can lead to extreme situations in which short-run gains are high, and these extreme situations can strain otherwise-healthy relationships and destroy gains from cooperation, even if they are rare. For example, when market demand ‡uctuates, sellers attempting to collude may …nd it especially pro…table to cut their prices when market demand is high (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) .
In this paper, we study the extent to which increasing the breadth of interactions can help foster cooperation. Field studies have highlighted the importance of broad relationships: for example, in describing the interactions between farmers in Shasta County, California, Ellickson reports that, "Rural residents deal with one another on a large number of fronts, and most residents expect those interactions to continue far into the future... They interact on water supply, controlled burns, fence repair, social events, sta¢ ng the volunteer …re department, and so on." (1994, p.55) Theoretical work pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) has shown that in broad relationships, parties may use the fact that cooperation is easy to sustain in some aspects of their relationship to help foster cooperation in more di¢ cult aspects, but for the most part, this work has primarily focused on environments with no random ‡uctuations. We ask whether and to what extent increasing the breadth of relationships in environments with random ‡uctuations aids cooperation.
Speci…cally, we consider a repeated simultaneous-move game composed of M identical and independent component games. We refer to a strategy pro…le of the component stage game as a component agreement. For a single component game (i.e., M = 1), the condition for a component agreement to be sustained as an equilibrium-to correspond in each period to the on-path play of a subgame-perfect equilibrium-is that for each player, the future value of adhering to the component agreement exceeds his maximal deviation gain across all states of the world. Since these games are identical, when M > 1, the same condition has to be satis…ed for the component agreement to be perfectly replicated, that is, to correspond to equilibrium play in each of the M component games.
If we relax the requirement of perfect replication slightly, however, the required condition changes substantially. Speci…cally, we say that a component agreement can be almost-perfectly replicated if for any " > 0, for su¢ ciently large M , there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which equilibrium play coincides with the component agreement in each component game with probability greater than 1 ". For a component agreement to be almost-perfectly replicated, the condition is that, for each player, his mean deviation gain-rather than his maximal deviation gain-is smaller than his future value of adhering to the component agreement.
There are therefore gains from multilateral cooperation, even if the component games are identical. To see why the mean component deviation gain matters for almost-perfect replication, note that if we were to perfectly replicate a component agreement, most of the time the average deviation gain is su¢ ciently close to the mean component deviation gain as the number of component games grows. We can therefore construct agreements-strategy pro…les of the stage game-that "chop and replace" play in states in which players have large average deviation gains with stage-game Nash equilibrium play, and these agreements can be sustained as an equilibrium.
While this limit result provides a condition for almost-perfect replication, it does not prescribe an optimal agreement in a relationship of …nite breadth. We therefore study optimal agreements for …nite values of M in several important economic settings. Speci…cally, we consider applications to favor-exchange games (Mobius, 2001) and to Bertrand collusion games with demand shocks (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) . Constructing optimal agreements in these settings involves modifying our "chop and replace"construction so as to be judicious with the "replace"aspect in a way that depends on the particular setting.
Our results also extend to a class of games with extensive-form stage games and private actions. In particular, we consider two classes of models of relational incentive contracts with noisy performance measures: one in which there is a single agent who exerts e¤ort in M activities, and one in which there are M agents who each exert e¤ort in a single activity. We show how our limit result can be applied to these settings, and we characterize optimal relational contracts for …nite values of M .
Related Literature Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show that, in a deterministic environment, conditioning play in one component game on outcomes in other component games can aid cooperation only if these component games are not identical. In this paper, we identify key conditions under which, in environments characterized by random ‡uctuations, conditioning play in one component game on outcomes in others can help foster cooperation.
The most closely related work is a contemporaneous paper by Sekiguchi (2015) , which studies how increasing the breadth of interaction a¤ects the optimal degree of collusion in a multimarket contact setting with stochastic demand realizations. Sekiguchi derives a critical discount factor such that for higher discount factors, almost-perfect collusion can be sustained as the number of markets approaches in…nity. Our paper di¤ers in several ways. First, our main limit result (Theorem 1) is weaker in a probabilistic sense, though it is proven in a more general economic environment. Fur-ther, our limit result characterizes necessary and su¢ cient conditions for any component agreement to be almost-perfectly replicated, whereas Sekiguchi focuses on optimal symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria. Our conditions for perfect collusion to be almost-perfectly replicated coincide with the critical discount factor that Sekiguchi identi…es. Finally, in addition to our limit results, we analyze optimal equilibrium agreements away from the limit in several classes of games, and we also consider a class of repeated extensive-form games with private actions.
Our application to relational incentive contracts with multiple activities is related to Bond and Gomes (2009) , which characterizes the optimal formal contract in an agency problem with multiple tasks and a …xed upper bound on total wage payments. In our application, the upper bound on total payments arises from the principal's limited commitment. Barron (2013) considers endogenous breadth of relational contracts in a supply-chain context and shows that suppliers underspecialize relative to the …rst-best. Fong and Li (Forthcoming) shows that intertemporal garbling of public information helps link incentive constraints in relational contracts so that shocks can be smoothed over time.
The Model
There are N players who play a repeated game in discrete time, which is indexed by t = 1; 2; : : : , and all players share a common discount factor 2 (0; 1). The stage game is composed of M identical component stage games, indexed by m 2 M = f1; : : : ; M g, which are played simultaneously. We refer to the repeated stage game as the supergame, the repeated component stage game as a component supergame, and we refer to M as the breadth of interaction.
Throughout, variables with tildes will correspond to variables from component supergames, and variables without tildes will correspond to variables from the supergame.
In each period t, within each component stage game m, a states m;t 2 S = f1; : : : ; Sg is drawn with probability ps m;t . Denote the vector of states realized in period t across all M component stage games as s t = (s 1;t ; : : : ;s M;t ) 2 S M . States are independent and identically distributed across periods and across component stage games: the probability that a state s t is realized is
Q M m=1 ps m;t . Within each component stage game m, the set of actions available to player i is given by the compact set A i , and we denote A = Q N i=1 A i . At the beginning of each period t, players commonly observe s t and then simultaneously choose their actions, which are commonly observed. Denote player i's actions in period t by the vector a i;t = (ã i;1;t ; : : : ;ã i;M;t ) 2 A M i . Player i's payo¤ in component stage game m in period t is given byũ i (ã i;m;t ;ã i;m;t ;s m;t ), whereã i;m;t 2 A i Q j6 =i A j . Payo¤s are additive across component stage games, so player i's stage-game payo¤ in period t is given by u i (a i;t ; a i;t ; s t ) = P M m=1ũ i (ã i;m;t ;ã i;m;t ;s m;t ). Component-stage-game payo¤s are bounded: there exists K > 0 such thatũ i (ã i;m;t ;ã i;m;t ;s m;t ) 2 [ K; K] for all i, m, and (ã i;m;t ;ã i;m;t ;s m;t ).
Cooperative Agreements, Strategies, and Equilibrium For expositional purposes, we refer to a pure strategy pro…le of the component stage game,Ã : S ! A, as a component agreement.
In each period t, within component game m, therefore,Ã i (s m;t ) 2 A i denotes player i's action underÃ in states m;t . A Nash equilibrium of a component stage game is a component agreementÃ such thatũ i Ã i (s m;t ) ;Ã i (s m;t ) ;s m;t ũ i ã i;m ;Ã i (s m;t ) ;s m;t for allã i;m 2 A i for all i and for alls m;t 2 S.
We refer to a pure strategy pro…le of the stage game, A : S M ! A M , as an agreement. Note that for each s t , A (s t ) is an M N matrix specifying actions for each player in each component
i for all i and for all s t 2 S M . We next de…ne strategies in a component supergame and in the supergame. Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to trigger strategies. In particular, a trigger strategy of a component supergame speci…es a component agreement,Ã (0) : S ! A, and an N -tuple Ã (1) ; : : : ;Ã (N ) , where eachÃ (i), i 6 = 0, is a Nash equilibrium of a component stage game. Play begins withÃ (0), and if player i was the …rst to deviate fromÃ (0), play transitions toÃ (i) for all future periods. A trigger strategy of the supergame speci…es an agreement A (0) : S M ! A M , and an N -tuple (A (1) ; : : : ; A (N )), where each A (i) is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Play begins with A (0), and if player i was the …rst to deviate from A (0), play transitions to A (i) for all future periods.
We will say that a component agreementÃ is an equilibrium component agreement if there exists a trigger strategy of the component game withÃ (0) =Ã that is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the component supergame. An agreement A is an equilibrium agreement if there exists a trigger strategy of the supergame with A (0) = A that is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the supergame.
Throughout, we assume that the component stage game has at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For each player i, denote byṽ i his lowest expected payo¤ in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a component stage game, and denote by v i his lowest expected payo¤ in any purestrategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Note that v i = Mṽ i , which we prove in Lemma A1 in the appendix. At the end of Section 3, we discuss our restriction to trigger strategies, purestrategy agreements, and pure-strategy Nash equilibrium punishments, and we discuss the role of our assumption that states in a given period are independent across component stage games.
General Limit Results
We study the degree to which an increase in the breadth of interaction helps sustain-in a way we will make precise below-a component agreementÃ as an equilibrium outcome. We …rst establish a necessary and su¢ cient condition forÃ to be an equilibrium component agreement. Recall that
;s m;t as player i's expected component-stage-game payo¤ underÃ. We refer to the quantitỹ Recall that our de…nition of an equilibrium component agreement involves the use of trigger strategies. For the purposes of characterizing whether a particular agreementÃ is an equilibrium agreement, it is without loss of generality to assume that, following a deviation by player i, players repeatedly play the Nash equilibrium of the component stage game that yields payo¤ṽ i for player i in each period. Therefore, a deviation by player i results in a component continuation loss underÃ given by Ṽ i Ã ṽ i Ã ṽ i = (1 ). ForÃ to be an equilibrium component agreement, a necessary and su¢ cient condition is that the component continuation loss exceeds the maximal component deviation gain for each player i. That is,
Next, we consider the e¤ect of an increase in the breadth of interaction on sustaining a component agreement as part of an equilibrium agreement. Given an agreement A : S M ! A M , we de…ne player i's deviation gain in state s t under A as
We also de…ne d max i (A) = max st fd i (s t ; A)g as player i's maximal deviation gain under A and d i (s t ; A) =M to be player i's average deviation gain under A. Similarly, a deviation by player i results in a continuation loss given by
. Given M , we next de…ne an "-neighborhood of component agreementÃ by
That is, an "-neighborhood of component agreementÃ is the set of all agreements A that prescribe the same play, component-stage-game by component-stage-game asÃ on a set of states that occurs with probability greater than 1 ". As " approaches zero, for any A 2 N M Ã ; " , each players' payo¤s in each component game converge to the payo¤s they would receive underÃ. Note that if A 2 N M Ã ; 0 , then A perfectly coincides withÃ in each component game, that is, for all s t , 
IfÃ can be almost-perfectly replicated, then we can de…ne, for any " > 0, the smallest integerM (") such that for all M M ("), there is an equilibrium agreement A 2 N M Ã ; " . Proposition 1. Consider a component agreementÃ. The following are true:
optimal in the component stage game, thenÃ cannot be almost-perfectly replicated.
3. Supposed mean i Ã = Ṽ i Ã for any i, andÃ can be almost-perfectly replicated. then
When players' deviation gains do not ‡uctuate, andd mean i Ã = Ṽ i Ã for all i,Ã is an equilibrium component agreement. The component agreementÃ can therefore be M -perfectly replicated for all M as stated in Part 1 of the proposition. When players' deviation gains do ‡uctuate, Part 2 shows thatÃ cannot be almost-perfectly replicated ifÃ is Pareto-optimal in the stage game. IfÃ is not Pareto-optimal in the stage game, there are games in whichÃ can be almost-perfectly replicated. In these cases, however, the rate of convergence is limited, as Part 3
shows.
Discussion of Model Assumptions
We now discuss how the results of Theorem 1 would continue to hold if we relaxed several of our models'assumptions.
First, it is not important that the component agreementÃ is a pure strategy of the component stage game. Rather, what is important is that any deviations fromÃ are commonly observed.
As long as this is the case, we can allow for mixed-strategy component agreements. For example, suppose each player submits a probability distribution to a randomization device, and a deviation occurs-and is commonly observed-if he submits a di¤erent probability distribution.
Next, for consistency, we have restrictedṽ i to be the lowest pure-strategy stage-game Nash equilibrium payo¤ for player i. We can rede…neṽ i to be the lowest (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium payo¤ for player i, and in our proposed trigger strategies, letÃ (i) correspond to the (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in which player i receivesṽ i , and the statement of Theorem 1 would remain unchanged. Therefore, the assumption that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the component stage game is not crucial for our results.
Third, we have restricted attention to trigger strategies. This restriction is without loss of generality if for each player i,ṽ i is his minmax payo¤ in the component stage game. This is the case in all the applications that follow.
Finally, when the component-stage-game states are independent from each other, we can apply the weak law of large numbers to show that if 
Optimal Agreements under Finite Breadth in Applications
While the limit result described in Theorem 1 provides a set of conditions for almost-perfect replication, it does not prescribe an optimal agreement when M < 1. In this section, we construct optimal agreements for …nite M in two sets of applications that are common in the literature on repeated games. The …rst is a favor-exchange setting in which multiple activities that require help arrive randomly each period (Mobius, 2001; Hauser and Hopenhayn, 2008) . The second is Bertrand collusion under multimarket contact (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) with demand ‡uctuations (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Sekiguchi, 2015) . The proof of Theorem 1 involves constructing a sequence of agreements that "chop and replace"play in the states in which players have large average deviation gains with stage-game Nash equilibrium play. Constructing optimal agreements in our two settings involves modifying this "chop and replace"construction, being judicious with the "replace"aspect in a way that depends on the particular setting.
We will say that an agreement A : S M ! A M is an optimal agreement if it is an equilibrium agreement, and it maximizes the sum of players' payo¤s over all equilibrium agreements. In the component stage game of each application, there is a Nash equilibrium in which each player receives his minmax payo¤. It is therefore without loss of generality to focus on trigger strategies when characterizing optimal agreements.
Favor Exchange with Multiple Activities
Our …rst application is to multilateral favor-exchange games. In a favor-exchange game, in each period, each player may independently need a favor that the other player can grant. Granting a favor is costly to the player who grants it, but it bene…ts the other player if he needs it. Cooperation increases total surplus, but concerns about whether favors will be returned in the future limit a This occurs whenever the costs of granting a favor are larger than the future surplus generated by continued interaction. However, favors are not needed in every period, and as long as the expected costs of granting needed favors is smaller than the future surplus generated by continued interaction, then full cooperation in the component game can be almost-perfectly replicated: there exists a sequence of equilibrium agreements in which all needed favors are granted with probability approaching 1 as M grows.
Further, we characterize optimal agreements when M is …nite. We …rst show that optimal agreements are symmetric threshold agreements: there is an integer H (M ) such that each player grants the other player up to H (M ) needed favors in each period. We show how to calculate H (M ), and we calculate the limit of H (M ) =M as M ! 1.
The Favor-Exchange Component Game There are N = 2 players. In each period t, each player i independently needs a favor with probability p. 1 We denote the state bys m;t = (s 1;m;t ;s 2;m;t ), wheres i;m;t 2 f0; 1g,s i;m;t = 1 indicates that player i needs a favor in period t, ands i;m;t = 0
indicates that he does not. There are therefore four states, S = f(0; 0) ; (0; 1) ; (1; 0) ; (1; 1)g, and states m;t = (k;`) occurs with probability p (k;`) = p k+`( 1 p) 2 (k+`) . Players simultaneously choose whether to grant a favor to the other. Player i choosesã i;m;t 2 A i = f0; 1g at cost cã i;m;t , whereã i;m;t indicates that player i grants a favor to player i. If player i needed the favor, he receives bene…ts bã i;m;t . We assume that b > c. Player i's payo¤ in period t is thereforẽ 
The Optimal Agreements when M < 1 Our next result further illustrates how multilateral interactions can improve cooperation in relationships of …nite breadth. We do so by characterizing an optimal agreement, that is, an equilibrium agreement that maximizes players'joint surplus over all equilibrium agreements. To describe an optimal agreement, it is useful to introduce a couple pieces of notation and terminology.
Denote by P (H; M ) the CDF of a binomial distribution with parameters (p; M ), so that P (H; M ) is the probability that there are H or fewer successes in M trials when the success probability for each trial is given by p. In addition, let h i (s t ) = (s i;1;t ; : : : ;s i;M;t ) denote player i's needs in state s t , and refer to H i (s t ) = P M m=1s i;m;t as player i's total needs in state s t . We will say that an agreement A is a symmetric cooperation agreement if the favors that player i grants are independent of his own needs and if the favors he grants as a function of player i's needs are the same as the favors player i grants as a function of player i's needs. That is, if
In an H-threshold cooperation agreement, which we denote by A H , player i's continuation loss is given by
These payo¤s correspond to the payo¤s players earn in each period if they grant up to H needed favors to each other. It is clear that the optimal threshold is weakly increasing, since total surplus is weakly increasing in the breadth of the relationship for a given threshold H. Moreover, Proposition 3 shows that the ratio of the optimal threshold relative to the total number of activities is in general increasing. 2 It is clear from Theorem 1 that as M ! 1, the limit of this ratio must exceed p, since full component cooperation can be almost-perfectly replicated. Proposition 3 provides the exact value for the limit.
Note that, even if M ! 1, the discount factor still constrains the fraction of needed favors that are granted in an optimal agreement. Of course, as increases, this fraction increases.
Bertrand Collusion and Multimarket Contact
The second application is to Bertrand collusion between duopolists who interact in multiple markets.
When demand ‡uctuates between high-and low-demand states, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) show that optimal collusive agreements involve more aggressive price competition when demand is higher.
In the same setting, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) demonstrate that contact in two markets with perfectly negatively correlated demand shocks helps sustain collusion in each relative to singlemarket collusion. Bernheim and Whinston (1987) consider more general correlation structures.
In this section, we consider the same model as in Bernheim and Whinston (1990) , but we assume demand shocks are independent across M separate markets. As in our application to favor-exchange games, we show that optimal agreements can be described by a threshold: …rms charge monopoly prices whenever the number of high-demand markets does not exceed a cuto¤ H (M ); otherwise, …rms charge prices yielding total pro…ts of (M ) across all M markets. We explicitly compute the limit of H (M )=M as M goes to in…nity.
The Bertrand Component Game There are N = 2 …rms. Both …rms produce identical products at zero marginal cost, and they simultaneously choose pricesã 1;m;t andã 2;m;t , and A i = [0; a] for some a large. The market price is the lowest price chosen by the two …rms, and we denote it byã m;t = min fã 1;m;t ;ã 2;m;t g. Market demand is given byq (ã m;t ;s m;t ), wheres m;t 2 S = fh; lg is a market demand state that is either high or low. In each period, market demand is high with probability p and low with probability 1 p. We assume thatq (ã m;t ; l) q (ã m;t ; h) for allã m;t . The total market pro…ts of the two …rms is therefore~ (ã m;t ;s m;t ) =ã m;tq (ã m;t ;s m;t ),
which we assume to be continuous inã m;t . We also assume that there is a monopoly price,ã (s) that uniquely maximizes total market pro…ts in market demand states 2 fh; lg. We denote the associated monopoly pro…ts as~ (s) ã (s) q (ã (s) ;s). Notice that~ (h) ~ (l).
We assume that the …rm with a lower price captures the entire market, and when both …rms choose the same price, they split the market demand equally. Firm i's pro…ts are therefore given Optimal Collusive Agreements when M < 1 Our next set of results describe optimal agreements, which maximize …rms' joint pro…ts among the set of all equilibrium agreements. To describe an optimal agreement, as in the favor-exchange application, let P (H; M ) be the CDF of a binomial distribution with parameters (p; M ), and with a slight abuse of notation, let p (H; M ) denote the associated probability mass function. In addition, de…ne H (s t ) to be the total number of markets in which the market demand is high: H (s t ) = P M m=1 1 fsm;t=hg , where 1 is an indicator function.
An agreement A is a symmetric collusive agreement if A 1;m (s t ) = A 2;m (s t ) for all s t . A symmetric collusion agreement is an H-threshold collusive agreement if, whenever H (s t ) H, A i;m (s t ) =ã (s m;t ), and whenever H (s t ) > H, A i;m (s t ) =ã (h) in exactly H markets for whichs m;t = h. In an H-threshold collusive agreement A H , …rm i's continuation loss is given by
The next proposition characterizes optimal agreements in this setting. Proposition 6 describes how the optimal threshold varies with the number of markets. As in the favor-exchange model, the optimal threshold is weakly increasing, and the limit is strictly increasing in the discount factor.
Imperfect Observability with Applications to Relational Contracts
We now show that the limit results in Theorem 1 also extend to a class of extensive-form stage games with imperfectly observable actions. In Section 5.1, we establish a limit result that corresponds to the results in Theorem 1. Sections 5. 
Replication in Games with Imperfect Observability
This section describes limit results for a class of extensive-form games with imperfect observability.
The class of games includes the application in Section 5.2. At the end of this section, we comment on how the limit results could similarly be extended to the class of games in Section 5.3.
There are N players. In each component stage game, each player i chooses a private actioñ a i;m;t 2 A i that is unobserved by others and a public actionb i;m;t 2 B i that is commonly observed. Player i's private action determines the distribution over his state,s i;m;t 2 S i , which is distributed according to distribution function G ( jã i;m;t ), and each player's state is commonly gives each player his minmax payo¤, which we normalize to 0. We will refer to this SPNE as a punishment component agreement. This assumption is satis…ed by our applications but is not replicated is again that the mean public deviation gain is smaller than the continuation loss for each player.
Relational Incentive Contracts with Multiple Activities
In this section, we consider optimal relational contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a Combining the conditions in Proposition 7, we see that as long as c < (p c) = (1 ), there exists an e¤ort-inducing agreement that can be almost-perfectly replicated. This implies that increasing the breadth of interaction helps sustain e¤ort. If the global constraint did not need to be satis…ed, the principal would optimally choose a threshold bonus scheme in which b m = 0 if output is su¢ ciently low, and b m = if output is su¢ ciently high. The thresholdm would be chosen such that the bonus that implements e¤ort given this threshold rule is minimized, as this would be the scheme with the smallest maximal bonus that is capable of satisfying the agent's local constraint.
However, this bonus scheme does not satisfy the agent's global constraint, as it also minimizes the agent's interim rents. In order to satisfy the agent's global constraint, the optimal contract chooses a lower threshold m <m such that if m were larger, the global constraint would be slack.
At this value of m , interim rents are then adjusted downward at the cuto¤ value by decreasing the amount paid at the cuto¤ value to < until the global constraint is exactly binding.
That the form of the optimal bonus scheme in this setting is not linear in realized output implies that the optimal relational contract pools together performance in the M independent tasks. Slack is transferred from states of the world in which the linear contract calls for large total bonus payments to states of the world in which it does not. Since the agent is motivated by his expected bonus, his incentives remain in place.
Relational Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents
Our …nal application is to a model of relational contracts with multiple agents and imperfect public monitoring of output but perfect public monitoring of bonus payments, similar to the model of Levin (2002) . In the optimal relational contract in this setting, the principal pays out a …xed bonus pool as long as one or more agents produces high output. The bonus in a given period is shared equally by all agents who produce high output in that period. We study how the number of agents a¤ects the conditions required for an e¤ort-inducing relational contract to be an equilibrium agreement.
Single-Agent Component Game There are two players, player 0 and, for reasons that will become clear, player m. Player 0 is a risk-neutral principal, and player m is a risk-neutral agent.
The component game is essentially the same as in the previous subsection, except that high output is not necessarily a perfect signal of e¤ort. That is, following an e¤ort choiceã m;t 2 f0; 1g, by the agent, the probability that output is high is p whenã m;t = 1 and r < p whenã m;t = 0, so that Pr [s m;t = 1jã m;t ] = pã m;t + r (1 ã m;t ). A component relational contract~ speci…es a wage paymentw m made to the agent, an e¤ort choiceẽ m by the agent, and a bonus paymentB 0 (s m;t )
made to the agent depending on the realization of output. As above, we can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to relational contracts that payB 0 (0) = 0 andB 0 (1) = b for some b 0.
Throughout, we will assume that p c > r, so that high e¤ort increases total surplus, and we will refer to a component relational~ specifyingẽ m = 1 as an component e¤ort-inducing relational contract. The base wage can be chosen so that the principal captures all the surplus, so we can write the principal's expected surplus asṽ 0 = p c.
For an e¤ort-inducing component relational contract to be an equilibrium component agreement, the bonus level b must be high enough that the agent prefers to chooseẽ m = 1 rather thanẽ m = 0.
That is, we must have b c= (p r). To ensure the principal is willing to pay the bonus, the bonus must be smaller than her expected future surplus: b ṽ 0 = (1 ). It is well-known that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an e¤ort-inducing component relational contract to be an equilibrium component agreement is given by adding these two inequalities together so that c= (p r)
Note that the right-hand side is the ratio between the principal's maximal deviation gain and the surplus of the relationship.
Multilateral Relational Contracts Now, suppose the principal (player 0) interacts with M agents (players 1; : : : ; M ) simultaneously. Again, assume that for each agent m, his output in period t is given by Pr [s m;t = 1jã m;t ] = pã m;t + r (1 ã m;t ), and his cost of e¤ort is c. Agents' outputs are independent. Levin (2002) shows that in this setting, an optimal relational contract speci…es a bonus pool B M to be shared by agents who produce high output. No bonuses are paid out when all outputs are low. In addition, the principal sets the wage payments w m to extract all the surplus.
An e¤ort-inducing relational contract is one that speci…esẽ m = 1 for all m, and we now describe the conditions required for an e¤ort-inducing relational contract to be an equilibrium agreement.
To motivate each agent m to choose high e¤ort, his expected bonus for high output must exceed c= (p r), or, for all m,
The left-hand side is the expected bonus of agent m conditional on having a high output. To ensure the principal is willing to pay the bonus, the condition is
where the right-hand side is the principal's future surplus. As above, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an e¤ort-inducing relational contract to be an equilibrium agreement is that the sum of these conditions is satis…ed:
The next proposition simpli…es this expression and makes clear how this condition varies with the number of agents, M . 
The condition in Proposition 9 is easier to satisfy for larger M : there are increasing returns to scale in sustaining e¤ort in multilateral relational contracts. The reason why e¤ort is easier to sustain in multilateral relational contracts, rather than in bilateral relational contracts is again because it allows for cross-subsidization of incentive constraints. When there are M agents, slack can be transferred from the output realizations in which the principal's deviation gain is small to output realizations in which her deviation gain is large while maintaining each agent's incentives to exert e¤ort. This proposition shows that this cross-subsidization can be made more e¤ective when the number of agents grows. In particular, when M ! 1, the condition required for an e¤ort-inducing relational contract to be an equilibrium agreement becomes
where notice that pc= (p r) is the average bonus paid in an e¤ort-inducing bilateral relational contract. In larger …rms, therefore, cooperation is limited not by the magnitude of the maximal bonus that needs to be paid out to a particular agent, but rather by the magnitude of the mean bonus paid out to all of the agents.
Conclusion
This paper explores the degree of e¢ ciency gains that can be achieved by increasing the number of activities that players engage in an in…nitely repeated game. We study a repeated game that is composed of M identical and independent component games. For a component agreement to be an equilibrium component agreement, the maximal deviation gain for each player must be smaller than the future surplus he can earn by adhering to the component agreement. As M tends toward in…nity, the component agreement can be almost-perfectly replicated as long as the mean deviation gain is smaller for each player than his future surplus. This is a considerably weaker condition, especially in very volatile environments.
We apply this result to three applications: favor exchange, multi-market contact, and multilateral relational contracts. In all three applications, we characterize the optimal agreement in games of …nite breadth. A common feature among all applications is that the optimal agreement takes a threshold form in the sense that a player will cooperate as much as possible as long as the deviation gain does not exceed an endogenous threshold.
Our results can be taken in several directions. For example, in a model with endogenous governance structures (such as …rm boundaries), the number of activities the …rm engages in a¤ects the optimal governance structure. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2011) take the view that governance structures should be designed to support cooperation by minimizing the maximal deviation gain.
Our analysis suggests that as the number of activities increases, the relevant deviation gain is the mean, rather than the maximal, deviation gain. In other words, optimal governance structures can change as businesses expand the breadth of their activities.
Another potential application is to organization formation. Our results suggest that organizations might arise precisely because cooperation is easier to sustain with a larger number of players.
Our results further suggest that the types of individuals who should be included in an organization depend on the scale of the organization. Smaller-scale organizations should pay more attention to maximal deviation gains, and therefore should hire individuals whose performance is predictable.
Larger-scale organizations should focus on mean deviation gains, and they can therefore tolerate individuals whose performance is more variable.
By the weak law of large numbers, there exists M (") such that for all M M ("), Pr [E] > 1 ". Now, for all M M ("), consider the following agreement A M :
where for some stage-game Nash equilibriumÂ,Â i;m (s t ) =â i;m . Consider the trigger strategy with A M (0) = A and each A M (i) being the Nash equilibrium of the stage game yielding v i for player i. Let v i A M be the expected per-period payo¤ of player i under this trigger strategy and
Now, for any s t 6 2 E, it is clear that no player has an incentive to deviate from A M (0). For s t 2 E, player i's gain from deviating is smaller than Md mean i Ã (1 + ") by the de…nition of E.
Player i's continuation loss is given by
player i will not deviate. The agreement A M is therefore an equilibrium agreement. In addition, Pr
We next turn to Part 2. Without loss of generality, we may assume thatd mean
Suppose to the contrary thatÃ can be almost-perfectly replicated. For any " > 0, there exists an equilibrium agreement A M and a set F S M such that (1) Pr [F] > 1 " and (2) for all s t 2 F, A M 1;m (s t ) =Ã 1 (s m;t ) for all m.
Let v 1 A M be player 1's per-period expected payo¤ associated with A M and V 1 A M his continuation loss. Since component-stage-game payo¤s are in [ K; K], it follows that V 1 A M M Ṽ 1 Ã + 2"K . Now, for A M to be an equilibrium agreement, a necessary condition is that player 1 cannot bene…t from deviating when s t 2 F:
Now, notice that
Md mean
Since this is true for all " > 0, it follows thatd mean 
which implies that A is not an equilibrium agreement.
For Parts 2 and 3, let A 2 N M Ã ; 0 . By Lemma A2, for any agreement A and for any k > 0,
For any A 2 N M Ã ; " , if the left-hand side of the inequality is strictly positive for k = V i (A), then A is not an equilibrium agreement. For any A 2 N M Ã ; " , we necessarily have that V i (A) V i A + "M K and Pr d i (s t ; A) 6 = d i s t ; A ". A necessary condition for the above inequality to hold with k = V i (A) is therefore
For Part 2, note that for all i, d i s t ; A =M converges tod mean i A = Ṽ i Ã . By the central limit theorem, the right-hand side of (4) converges to 1 ( K") " as M ! 1,where is the cdf for a normal random variable with mean zero and variance 2 = V ar d i s m;t ;Ã . Taking " to zero, the right-hand side approaches 1=2, which implies thatÃ cannot be almost-perfectly replicated.
For Part 3, ifÃ can be almost-perfectly replicated, then as " ! 0 and M ! 1, the left-hand side of (4) has to go to zero. It is therefore necessary that the right-hand side also goes to zero as " ! 0, so that we must have Proof of Proposition 2. To prove Proposition 2, we …rst prove two preliminary results. First, we show that an optimal agreement must give both players the same expected payo¤. Second, we show that if there is an optimal agreement, there is a symmetric optimal agreement.
Step 1. Any optimal equilibrium must give both players the same expected payo¤. Take an arbitrary agreement A. Recall that f i (s t ; A) = P M m=1 A i (s t ) is the number of favors player i grants in state s t under agreement A. De…ne the expected number of favors player i grants under A as F i (A).
Now de…ne E i (F i ) as the set of stage-game strategy pro…les in which player i grants F i favors in expectation. Each agreement A with A i 2 E i (F i ) is associated with a maximal reneging temptation for player i. Let d i (F i ) be the smallest maximal reneging temptation among all such agreements, and letf i (
as the set of stage-game strategy pro…les in which player i grants F i favors in expectation, and so his maximal deviation gain is d i (F ). The game is symmetric, sof 1 (F ) =f 2 (F ) f (F ) for all F , and it is clear thatf (F ) is weakly increasing in F . Now, take an optimal agreement A that gives player i expected per-period payo¤ of v i . It follows that
Let d max i be the maximal deviation gain for player i, and let f max i be the associated maximal number of favors player i is asked to grant. Since A is an equilibrium agreement, we must have that for each i,
Now, suppose to the contrary that v 1 > v 2 . It follows that F 2 > F 1 . For small enough feasible " > 0, choose an agreement A with A 1 2 E 1 (F 1 + ") and A 2 2 E 2 (F 2 ). This agreement gives per-period payo¤s of v 1 c" for player 1 and v 2 + b" for player 2. In addition, player 1's maximal deviation gain isf 1 (F 1 + ") c and player 2's isf 2 (F 2 ) c. For small enough feasible ", we havê
where the …rst inequality follows becausef i is weakly increasing, and F 1 < F 2 ; the second inequality follows because A 2 2 E 2 (F 2 ); the third inequality follows, because the initial agreement is an equilibrium agreement; the …nal inequality follows, because v 1 > v 2 . This implies that player 1 will not deviate. In addition, for player 2,
so player 2 will not deviate either. Therefore, A is an equilibrium agreement. Moreover, its total surplus is larger than the original agreement's, since more needed favors are granted in expectation. This contradicts the claim that the original agreement was optimal.
Step 2. If there is an optimal agreement, there is a symmetric agreement that is optimal. For each s t , we can de…ne the mirror image state s 0 t in whichs 0 i;m;t =s i;m;t . Take an optimal agreement A . By Step 1, the associated payo¤s satisfy v 1 = v 2 = v , and therefore, the associated expected number of favors players grants are given by F 1 = F 2 = F . Let d max i be the associated maximal deviation gain for player i. Since A is an equilibrium agreement, it must be the case that for i = 1; 2, d max i v = (1 ). Now, construct a new agreementÂ such that for all s t ,Â 1 (s t ) = A 1 (s t ) andÂ 2 (s t ) = A 1 (s 0 t ). Under agreementÂ, players'payo¤s arev 1 =v 2 = v , and both players'maximal deviation gains are d max 1 , soÂ is an equilibrium agreement.
Step 3. Proof of Proposition 2. Take an optimal symmetric agreement A that gives each player an expected per-period payo¤ of v . Let f max i be the maximal number of favors player i is expected to carry out under A . Since A is an equilibrium agreement, it follows that cf max i v = (1 ). Suppose that under A , there is a state s 0 t in which P M m=1 A 1;m (s 0 t ) f max 1 1 and somem for which A 1;m (s 0 t ) = 0 andsm ;t = 1. Now, consider a new agreementÂ which coincides with A 1;m (s 0 t ) for all m 6 =m andÂ 1;m (s 0 t ) = 1. AdjustÂ 2 accordingly to preserve symmetry. This new agreement does not increase either player's maximal deviation gain, but it increases the expected number of favors granted in each period and therefore increases both players' payo¤s. This contradicts the claim that A was an optimal agreement and proves that any optimal symmetric agreement is an H-threshold cooperation agreement.
Finally, since total expected surplus is increasing in H, it is clear that an optimal agreement speci…es the largest H such that players'maximal deviation gains are smaller than their continuation losses. Taking " to zero, we obtain the desired result. Proof of Proposition 5. We …rst show that for any equilibrium agreement A, there is a symmetric collusive agreement that yields the same total pro…ts. Given any agreement A : S M ! A M , de…ne the associated total pro…ts in state s t as (s t ; A) = P M m=1ã m;t (s t )q (ã m;t (s t ) ;s m;t ) and the associated expected per-period pro…ts as (A) = P st Pr [s t ] (s t ; A). By the same type of argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, a necessary condition for A to be an equilibrium agreement is that max st (s t ; A) 1 (A) .
If A satis…es this condition, construct agreementÂ such that for each i,Â i;m (s t ) =ã m;t (s t ). Under this agreement, u i s t ;Â = (s t ; A) =2, so d max i Â = max st (s t ; A) =2 and v (A) = (A) =2.Â is therefore an equilibrium agreement, and it is a symmetric collusive agreement. Next, take an optimal agreement A , and let (A ) denote the total per-period expected pro…ts under A . For each s t , if (s t ; A ) < (A ) = (1 ), then an argument similar to that in Proposition 2 implies that both …rms set the monopoly price in each market, that is A i;m (s t ) =ã (s m;t ). This implies there exists a largest integer, H , which satis…es H ~ (h) + M H ~ (l) (A ) = (1 ). Moreover, whenever H (s t ) H , both …rms set the monopoly price in each market. Whenever H (s t ) > H , then market pro…ts are exactly equal to (A ). It must therefore be the case that (A ) solves the following equation: where the …rst inequality follows from MLRP, and the second inequality follows from the condition above. Since (1 2") pb > c, the agent's net deviation gain is at most c (1 ") pb < 0. We next show that the principal does not want to deviate. The necessary and su¢ cient condition is that m b M 1 (p pb) .
Note that this condition is essentially (taking into account the integer constraint)
For " small enough, this condition is satis…ed whenever pb < (p pb) (1 ) . An e¤ort-inducing agreement can therefore be almost-perfectly replicated. Proof of Proposition 8. The proof of this proposition is broken into several steps.
Step 1. Because the salary component of the relational contract can be used to extract all the surplus from the agent at the beginning of each period, it su¢ ces to …nd a bonus scheme (b m ) M m=0 that satis…es the agent's incentive-compatibility constraints and has the smallest maximal payment. This dual problem can be written as a linear program. Let p (m; K) denote the probability that m outputs are high realized given the agent exerts e¤ort in L tasks. We then have: ( 1 + 2 ) p (0; M ) 1 p (0; M 1) < 0, where the last inequality follows from the argument above. This implies that 0 > 0, and therefore b 0 = 0.
Step 4. We now show that b m solves (5) . First, derive the marginal net bene…t of exerting e¤ort on the Lth task for the conjectured solution: We want to show that only L = 0 or L = M is ever optimal. To do so, we examine how (L) changes with L. Note that (L) = p (m 1; L 1) p + p (m ; L 1) p ( ) c.
The marginal bene…t of e¤ort on the Lth task is times the probability that with only L 1 tasks, the agent would have had m 1 successes (receiving a bonus of 0) but instead has m successes (receiving a bonus of ) plus ( ) times the probability that the agent would have had m successes (receiving ) with only L 1 tasks but instead has m + 1 successes (receiving ).
It can be shown that (L) for L m is either weakly decreasing or it initially increases and then decreases. We do not replicate the proof here, because it is similar to the result of Proposition 3 in Bond and Gomes (2009, p. 187). Finally, note that (M ) 0, because the (LIC) constraint is satis…ed. Given this structure of marginal bene…ts, the agent's problem either has one peak (at L = M ) or two peaks (one at L = 0 and another at L = M ), so the agent's optimal choice of e¤ort is either L = 0 or L = M . Thus, the solution to the relaxed problem is in fact the solution to the full problem.
